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Cornhusker Economics
Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies Are
A Means of Income Redistribution
The U.S. federal crop insurance is a major farm policy
aimed at providing risk protection/reduced risk exposure to agricultural producers. A key component of
this policy is the provision of multiple contract options and premium subsidies that reduce the cost of
crop insurance to agricultural producers. Premium
subsidies have been growing over time and accounted
for more than $6 billion in government outlays in
2019, with $2 billion being applied to coverage levels
of 80% and higher (USDA-RMA, 2020). While the
government has justified the use of premium subsidies
as a necessary means of increasing producer participation in crop insurance, many have argued that premium subsidies are just another means of income redistribution from taxpayers to producers.
Given the significant producer heterogeneity with respect to attitudes towards risk and the fact that these
attitudes are private information, an argument can
also be made that premium subsidies are a means of
resolving this information asymmetry and inducing
certain insurance contract choices by producers. Indeed, the provision of multiple insurance contracts
reveals the government’s objective of inducing a separating equilibrium (where producers select from a
menu of contracts based on their risk preferences) and
the premium subsidies represent a necessary means of
achieving this objective.
A recent study of ours published in PLoS ONE seeks
to analyze and evaluate all different policy objectives/
roles of premium subsidies and improve our understanding of the relationship between the stated and
revealed government objectives and the role of premium subsidies in achieving these objectives.

To study the role of premium subsidies in crop
insurance policy design and implementation, the
research develops a novel framework of analysis
that effectively captures the empirically relevant
heterogeneity in producer attitudes towards risk
(which has been ignored by the relevant literature), as well as the tradeoffs involved in producer
decisions with respect to different crop insurance
options/contracts available to them. The stated
government objective of premium subsidies to
increase producer participation in crop insurance
is evaluated along with their role in inducing the
desired producer behavior and a separating equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information, and transferring income from taxpayers
to agricultural producers/policy participants.
The analysis reveals a strong connection and a
complementarity between the stated and revealed
policy objectives of the government. Premium
subsidies can, indeed, increase producer participation in the program, induce a (any) desired
separating equilibrium with producers with
different levels of risk aversion choosing different
levels of risk coverage, and result in welfare transfers to agricultural producers.
In particular, premium subsidies do increase producer participation in crop insurance. Crop insurance data from the Risk Management Agency
(RMA) is consistent with the positive impact of
premium subsidies on producer participation in
crop insurance over time. Through the implementation of several legislative acts expanding
premium subsidies, the crop insurance program
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grew from $254.8 million in premium subsidies for
99.6 million insured acres in 1994 to $6.36 billion in
premium subsidies for 769 million insured acres in
2019.
The analysis also shows that premium subsidies can
induce a desirable separating equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information by making the participation of producers with different attitudes towards
risk in the policies designed for them incentive compatible. The change in the structure of premium subsidies by the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act
(ARPA) can be viewed as an attempt to induce a different separating equilibrium. In 2000, the year before
ARPA was enacted, the average per acre subsidy for
low-coverage insurance (i.e., coverage below 80%) was
$4.74, while the average subsidy for high-coverage insurance (i.e., coverage at or above 80%) was $2.49 per
acre. In 2001, the first year ARPA took effect, the average per acre subsidy for low-coverage insurance increased to $8.29 while the average per acre subsidy for
high-coverage insurance increased to $9.23. The percent of acres in a high-coverage contract increased
from 5.9% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2001, a 57.6% change.
Finally, premium subsidies function as means of income redistribution from taxpayers to agricultural producers that participate in crop insurance. As noted earlier, premium subsidies have been growing over time
and accounted for $6.26 billion and $6.36 billion in
2018 and 2019, respectively. The low-coverage insurance policies received $4.2 billion in 2018 and $4.32
billion in 2019, while high-coverage policies received
$2.07 billion in 2018 and $2.04 billion in 2019.
Given that premium subsidies result in income transfers from taxpayers to producers who participate in
crop insurance, the question that naturally arises (and
is at the heart of this research) is whether these transfers are a goal or a necessity for the desired increased
participation (and a separating equilibrium) to emerge.
To answer this question, we evaluated whether the government could achieve increased participation at reduced costs. It turns out that it can, which makes income redistribution very much a goal of this government policy.
In particular, our analysis shows that the government
could achieve the (any) desired increase in producer
participation by providing the premium subsidy associated with the low-coverage crop insurance to new
participants only. Without a subsidy paid to producers

with low-coverage insurance already in the program, there would be no need for a subsidy for existing producers with high-coverage insurance to
maintain the desired separating equilibrium (and
the share/type of producers opting for highcoverage crop insurance). It is important to note
that, under this mechanism, the new policy participants would receive the premium subsidy for as
long as the government desired their participation
in crop insurance. Existing policy participants
(who keep paying the same premium rate) would
have no incentive to leave the program as their expected returns with crop insurance are greater
than those without. In addition, by participating in
the program and purchasing a certain coverage
level, a producer reveals their true type/level of risk
aversion. If such producers were to leave the program one year, they would be able to reenter with
the terms that were in place when they were participating (and would not be eligible for new subsidies designed to induce producers that used to self
-insure to enter the program).
At this point, it is also important to note that,
while our analysis focuses on the introduction of
new premium subsidies, our results are more general and apply also to cases where the government
increases the magnitude of existing subsidies. In
such a case, under our proposed mechanism, it is
the increase in the premium subsidy associated
with the low-coverage insurance that would be
available only to new policy participants (while
existing policy participants would keep paying the
premium associated with their chosen insurance
coverage policy, which includes the subsidies already in place). Put in a different way, in cases
where the government already subsidizes different
insurance coverage policies, our proposed mechanism would not remove existing subsidies from
current policy participants but would, instead,
make the increase in the current premium subsidies available only to new policy participants.
To assess the magnitude of the savings associated
with the implementation of our proposed policy
design, we compare its costs to those of ARPA,
focusing on the years before and after the implementation of this reform. We estimate that the alternative policy design could have achieved the
same acreage enrollment in crop insurance by

saving taxpayers $780 million, or 95% of the new subsidy payments in 2001 alone. It is important to note
that additional savings would have been realized also
in subsequent years as premium subsidies under
ARPA have continued to exist.
The fact that the proposed design can achieve the stated government objective of increased producer participation at reduced costs invalidates the argument
that the income redistribution taking place under the
current policy design is necessary for increasing producer participation in crop insurance. The presence of
a policy design that can achieve increased producer
participation and induce any desired separating equilibrium at reduced costs reveals that the premium
subsidies in the current policy design are either a
means of income redistribution or a policy failure.
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